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Minority investors’ protection is one of the major missions to the securities 
regulation sector around the world. In China, regulation authorities also highlight it, 
which is set forth in the first article of the most securities act. Then, why is Minority 
investors’ protection essential? What is the mechanism of the protection? How to 
protect minority investors? Whether the more complete the law is, the more effective 
the regulation is? The paper answer these questions by economics theory explanation 
and empirical analysis based on the securities regulation in China.  
First of all, the basic theory of investor protection lays the groundwork for the 
further study. It expounds the reason of the investor protection and the way of 
protection in theory, of which the theories of institutional economics and regulatory 
economics explain the basic function of the institution in the perspective of law and 
government； moreover, the optimum enforcement theory sets up the principle of 
optimum enforcement by using benefit-cost theory of economics. After the basic 
theory, the paper elaborates the mechanism of the minorities’ protection. First, the 
paper describes the logic of the minority’s shareholders’ interest being infringed upon 
by the majorities, and it probes the economy motivation of regulator protecting 
minorities’ interest. Furthermore it presents the analysis of market equilibrium 
combining the insider infringing behavior and the outsider’s protection behavior. 
Basing on the mechanism analysis, the article builds up four kind of model: 
minorities’ interest model, the capture model of regulation, social welfare model and 
regulator group’s interest model. Minorities, majorities and regulator each have 
different objective function. Each of them will choose the optimum behavioral 
strategic to maximizing profit. 
Then, Based on the existing context of China, empirical test examines the effect 
from institutional enforcement. In China, the law of investor protection is more and 
more completed, while the level of the law enforcement keeps low. Actually, 
institutional enforcement is more important comparing to the rules. The paper tests the 
effect of the law enforcement in the dimension of minority’s interest, corporate 
governance and market. The empirical analysis reveals that there is no significant 
relation between the protection enforcement and control private benefit in the aspect 














results in the turnover of CEO in the company, and do not increase the CEO 
turnover’s sensitivity to the corporate performance in the aspect of corporate 
governance； and the punishment relates positively to the abnormal fluctuation of 
stock price, which means it does not work in stabling market price of stocks. From the 
result above shows that the investor protection mechanism does not work actually. 
This embodies the feature of captive theory. The combination of the regulator’s 
interest and majority’s interest in reality also convinced the idea. Then how to 
enhance the institutional enforcement? In the last chapter, on the basis of previous 
analysis I put forth some policies and suggestions to improve investor protection in 
the two perspectives: rules and enforcement.  
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国资本市场发展报告》，在深圳证券交易所市场上，2007 年 1 月至 8 月现金及
持股市场值在 100 万元以下的个人投资者的持股账户数量占实际持有股票账户
















这种理念已在现实中得以验证，E Glaeser et al.（2001）的研究表明了






































































是一再受损。根据张育军（2005）的研究，从 1993 年至 2004 年我国投资者平
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